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1

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is before the Utah Supreme Court upon a grant of writ of certiorari from the
order, judgment, or decree of the Utah Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction to hear this matter
is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3102(3)(a) (1953 as amended), and 78A-3-102(5).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or application
of Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(10)?
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, t 7, 94 P.3d 915, quoting State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
"Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact and law. While we defer
to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, we
review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, \
2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the determination
of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation requires the application of the
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terms of a court order to a given set of facts. This process is in reality a mixed question
of fact and law, and we are not bound by the conclusion reached by the trial court.").
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the district court's
factual determinations?
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."
Bowling, 2004 UT 50, | 7, quoting Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199.
CITATION TO DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Citation to the Utah Court of Appeals decision is Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT
App74,231P.3d815.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this
appeal:
Statutes:
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and (10) (2010):
(8)(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.

2

2.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985):
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that
the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex
unless it is further established by the person receiving alimony that
the relationship or association between them is without sexual
contact.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The parties in this matter were divorced in June of 2006. R at 188: l.1 As part of
the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner, Becky Sue Myers ("Wife"), was awarded alimony. R.
at 188-187: 2.
Respondent, Tracy Lynn Myers ("Husband") filed a Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce on January 31, 2008. R at 94-92. In that Petition, Husband alleged that Wife
was cohabitating and that Husband could no longer pay alimony, and that alimony should
be terminated. R. at 94: 3, 4 and 93: 5. On April 30, 2008, Wife filed her Verified
Answer to Respondent's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, denying the allegations. R.
at 146-142.
A bench trial was held in regard to this matter on July 1, 2008, before the
Honorable Samuel McVey. R. at 176. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 188-184. An Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce was signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. In the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated in its conclusions that "[pjursuant to
1

There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. page number."
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Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case terminates upon establishment by
the Husband that Wife is cohabitating with another person." R. at 184:6.
As a result, the trial court ordered that "Husband's obligation to pay Wife alimony
is terminated in this case, effective January 31, 2008." R. at 192: 1. Wife filed an appeal
timely. R. at 200: 1-2. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, 231 P.3d 815.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced in June of 2006. R. at 188:1. Following the divorce,
Wife moved in with her parents in or around the Spring of 2007. R. at 187:3. While
living at her parents' house, Wife slept on a couch. Tr. at 12: 24. Wife's parents allow
foster boys to live with them in the home, and did during the period that Wife was staying
with her parents. Tr. at 128: 17-19. At the time, a foster child, M.H., was staying at the
residence. Tr. at 127: 2-4 and 132: 15. While staying there, M.H. had a room that he
stayed in with another foster child. Tr. at 107: 4-7. Husband alleged that Wife
cohabitated with M.H., having sexual contact and sharing a common residence with him.
R. at 93: 5. Husband did not call M.H. to testify.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in its construction or application of Utah
Code Annotated § 30-3-5(10) and correctly analyzed the case under the two prongs
required to show cohabitation: (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact akin to that
2

Wife denies any allegations that there was a sexual or romantic relationship between
Wife and M.H. Because M.H. was a minor at the time periods at issue, in order to
maintain his privacy, the initials M.H. will be used for purposes of this brief.
4

existing in a marriage. Husband is incorrect that the Utah Court of Appeals added a third
prong to the cohabitation analysis; specifically, a prong requiring a trial court to
determine whether the parties entered into a relationship akin to that existing between
husband and wife.
Husband is also incorrect in arguing that the Utah Court of Appeals removed the
burden shifting element that was present under previous versions of the cohabitation
statute, which required the payor spouse to show common residency and the payee
spouse to show a lack of sexual contact. First, the presence of the burden shift was not
dispositive on this matter on appeal. Second, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct that
the Utah Legislature removed the burden shift requirement.
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in its review of the district court's factual
determinations. First, the Utah Court of Appeals did not disturb or disagree with any of
the findings made by the trial court. Rather, it correctly applied and followed the
standard of review for termination of alimony cases for cohabitation, disagreeing with the
ultimate conclusions of the trial court. Second, this Court should ignore Husband's
arguments that the Court should consider what the trial court could have inferred from the
evidence, but to which the trial court made no specific findings. Finally, Husband's
invitation that this Court consider evidence not on the record is inappropriate and should
be declined.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS
CONSTRUCTION OR APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 30-3-5(10)
The question of whether or not alimony may be terminated is governed by Utah

Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(10), which states "[a]ny order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." In the present case,
the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in its construction and application of this code
section. Husband's arguments to the contrary are incorrect. First, Husband argues that
the Utah Court of Appeals added a third prong to the cohabitation analysis as set forth in
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). Second, Husband argues that the Utah
Court of Appeals removed the burden shifting element previously provided for by Utah
Code. Each of these arguments will be examined in turn below.
A.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ADD A THIRD PRONG TO
THE COHABITATION ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY BY
THIS COURT
Husband argues that the Utah Court of Appeals failed to appropriately construe

and apply Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10), and that this is evidenced by the alleged
addition of a third prong to the traditional two prong test established in Haddow. That
two prong test requires a showing of (1) common residency, which is defined as "the
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more
than a temporary or brief period of time;" and (2) sexual contact, which "means
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participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing
between husband and wife." Haddow, 101 P.2d at 672.
These two prongs support the overarching idea that before alimony will be
terminated, it is expected that the receiving spouse be engaged in a relationship that is,
but for the license, a marriage, and concurrently the idea that the parties have begun to
take responsibility for each other in both an emotional and economic sense. In Myers, the
Utah Court of Appeals recognized this, stating "[m]aking cohabitation the standard for
terminating alimony is consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling 'the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge.'" 2010 UT App. 74,
116, quoting Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, \ 3, 190 P.3d 13. Consider
also, the comment of the Utah Court of Appeals in Sigg v. Sigg, that
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise
lived as though they were husband and wife.

905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). The importance of the idea
that the parties be living in a relationship akin to a marriage becomes even more clear
when exploring each of the above two Haddow prongs in turn.
1.

THE COMMON RESIDENCY PRONG
Common residency is defined as "the sharing of a common abode that both parties

consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time."
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. In regard to common residency, both this Court and the Utah
7

Court of Appeals have found it helpful to consider such factors as the sharing of living
expenses, unfettered access to living quarters, sharing of food expenses and meals, and
storing personal belongings in the other partner's living quarters, in reaching the ultimate
conclusion of whether two individuals are sharing a common residency for alimony
termination purposes.
Also, in Haddow, this Court stated that "[although we do not consider the sharing
of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite
element of cohabitation, we do find it significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of
appellant's living expenses or consistently share with her any of his assets." 707 P.2d at
673. Further, "Mr. Hudson did not contribute anything to appellant's mortgage
payments, the insurance on her house, or her utility bills." Id. at 673-674. Ultimately, in
Haddow this Court determined that there was not a common residency present. In
Pendleton v. Pendleton, the Utah Court of Appeals confirmed that the sharing of living
expenses is an important, though not a dispositive factor, stating "[ajlthough neither the
presence of portable possessions nor the sharing of living expenses is dispositive, either
may nonetheless be indicative of maintaining a shared household and be regarded as
some evidence of residency." 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In addition,
"while it is not important if the two share assets in a general sense, it may indeed be
relevant if one party pays the other's mortgage, the insurance on his or her house, or the
utility bills-actions which would be quite atypical for a mere visitor, even a regular and
frequent visitor." Id. at 160-161. In Jensen v. Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found
that, amongst other factors, the lack of shared expenses was relevant, finding "[t]he
8

evidence does not indicate that Wife shared living or food expenses with Mr. Andrews."
2007 UT App. 377, ^ 3. In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the
trial court's determination that there was not a shared residence. Finally, in Sigg, the
Utah Court of Appeals found the following to be relevant indicators of a common
residency:
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise
lived as though they were husband and wife.
905 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
In regard to access to living quarters, in Pendleton, where the Utah Court of
Appeals did find a common residency, it was relevant that the boyfriend "had his own
key to Joyce's home," that "he came and went from Joyce's home three to four times
daily, even when she was not there." 918 P.2d at 161. Consider also Haddow, where this
Court found the following:
The trial court made no finding that Mr. Hudson either spent any time at the
home when appellant was not there or had a key to the house. These
circumstances seem particularly significant on the question of whether Mr.
Hudson was living with appellant, since a resident will come and go as he
pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however regular and frequent, will
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person he is visiting.
707 P.2d at 673 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals also found a common
residency in Sigg, where despite the fact that a couple had "separate condominiums in the
same condominium complex," they had "open access to each other's condominiums."
905 P.2d at 917-918. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found a common residency
not to exist where the Husband did not have "open access to the Andrewses' home."
9

2007 UT App. 377, U 3. The facts in that case indicated that "Wife lived in the same
residence as Mr. Andrews off and on for two months, sharing a bedroom with Mr.
Andrews's sister." Id. at If 2. Further, that "Wife did not have a key to the Andre wses'
home, had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her stay." Id. at f 3.
Finally, in regard to the storing of personal items in each parties' living quarters
and the sharing of meals, in Haddow, it was significant that the boyfriend "did not move
any furniture into appellant's home or keep there any personal items other than toiletry
articles, a few items of clothing . . . and one picture album.'' 707 P.2d at 673. Further, in
Jensen, "Wife . . . had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her stay."
2007 UT App. 377, ^f 3. Where a common residence has been established, the Utah Court
of Appeals found it important in Pendleton that "Joyce and Bill ate almost all meals
together when Bill was in town-invariably at Joyce's house," and "Bill kept clothing and
other personal effects at Joyce's home." 918 P.2d at 161.
The above factors attempt to give substance to the first prong of the two prong test
established in Haddow, both prongs of which ultimately probe into the overarching issue
of whether or not, but for the license, a couple has entered into a relationship that really is
in fact a marriage. It is telling that Husband has declined to quote Haddow in its entirety.
Specifically, at one point Husband quotes in part, " . . . we do not consider the sharing of
the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite
element of cohabitation . . ." Husband's Brief at pg. 10 quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at
673. However, there is a marked difference in the thrust of the sentence when it is quoted
in its entirety; "[although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations
10

surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of cohabitation, we
do find it significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of appellant's living expenses or
consistently share with her any of his assets." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673 (emphasis
added). Clearly, while the above factors are not dispositive, they are important in the
cohabitation analysis as set forth in Haddow, and have remained important since
Haddow,
The Utah Court of Appeals has not deviated from the framework set forth in
Haddow, in fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has issued an opinion that is in line with
Haddow and its progeny by applying the Haddow standards to the facts present in Myers.
The issue of cohabitation involves an inquiry that must be examined on a case by case
basis. At the very heart of Haddow is the idea of whether or not the parties are living in a
relationship akin to that of a marriage. The Utah Court of Appeals did not add a third
prong, but instead correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) and recognized the
policy implications of that statute, and this Court's analysis under Haddow. Husband
argues that the following statement is a deviation from Utah Code and the Haddow test:
In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that the trial court
took an unduly narrow view of cohabitation. As noted above, while
common residency and sexual contact are certainly key to the question of
whether two people have formed a relationship resembling a marriage - most married couples do live together and have at least occasional sexual
contact - -the inquiry does not end there. A court must take the next step
and determine whether the parties entered into a relationship cakin to that
generally existing between husband and wife.'
Myers, 21010 UT App 74, ^ 17, quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. The above statement
is not an additional third prong, it is a correct restatement regarding the policy
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considerations present in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10) and this Court's
interpretation of the statute in Haddow. It is not a simple question of whether the parties
have the same mailing address, or stay in the same physical residence and whether there
is sexual contact. It is whether the relationship amounts to the level of that expected in a
marriage.
Husband's arguments also exhibit a failure to understand the nature of the test set
forth in Haddow. In particular, Husband focuses on the common residency prong,
arguing that "[cjommon residence or domicile need not be akin to that existing between a
husband and wife." Husband's Brief at pg. 9. It is important to understand what
Husband is advocating. Husband is advocating that simply having the same mailing
address is enough.
This argument completely ignores the economic implications of terminating
alimony, specifically that "[m]aking cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is
consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling 'the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly
as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge.'" Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, f 16, quoting Ostermiller,
2008 UT App. 249, f 3. This argument also ignores the factors that this Court established
in Haddow and that the Utah Court of Appeals has applied in alimony termination cases
for cohabitation since Haddow. Factors such as the sharing of financial obligations,
sharing of living quarters, and the sharing of meals. It is true that none of these factors is
dispositive, and that not every factor will apply to every case, but that does not make
them irrelevant to the inquiry. The Utah Court of Appeals did not make any of the
12

commonly examined factors a requirement for a finding of common residency. However,
it did acknowledge a lack of any evidence satisfying any of the factors commonly
examined, "we have no evidence of shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared
space, or shared meals." Myers 2010 UT App. 74, ^ 18. The Utah Court of Appeals
correctly recognized that the trial court did not conduct any analysis regarding the
evidence and these factors.
Husband also argues that the Utah Court of Appeals failed to "look at the total
circumstances to decide whether Ex-Wife and her cohabitant lived together." Husband's
Brief at pg. 10. The argument that a court should "look at the total circumstances" is
interesting in light of Husband's earlier argument that all that is necessary to satisfy at
least the common residency prong, is simply to examine whether or not two individuals
share the same address. Presumably this is the "total circumstances" Husband refers to.
If simply having the same address were enough, then this Court in Haddow and the Utah
Court of Appeals for the last twenty five years have been analyzing cohabitation cases
incorrectly.
In this case, there was no evidence presented that Wife and Mr. Hart shared living
expenses, that Wife had free access to Mr. Hart's living quarters, or that Wife ate meals
regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses with him or kept clothing or other personal
items in his living quarters. The only evidence regarding a common residency was that
the two shared the same address for approximately four months. This is not enough. The
Utah Court of Appeals recognized this and has not added a third prong by making any of
the factors examined under common residency dispositive, or adding a third prong
13

requiring that a trial court determine if a couple is living together in a relationship akin to
that generally existing between husband and wife.
2.

THE SEXUAL CONTACT PRONG
In regard to the sexual contact prong, Haddow has made the importance of

determining if the parties are living in a marital type relationship explicit. Specifically, it
requires "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally
existing between husband and wife." 707 P.2d at 672. The Utah Court of Appeals did
not disturb the findings of the trial court, but felt that at best, the evidence showed that
Wife and M.H. "apparently shared a furtive sexual relationship." Myers, 2010 UT App.
74, ^f 18. This is not enough to satisfy the second prong of the cohabitation test. While
Wife disagrees that any sexual contact occurred, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct
in its analysis that the evidence did not support the conclusion that a relatively permanent
sexual relationship that would generally exist between man and wife was present. The
Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied § 30-3-5(10) to this prong as well.
B.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REMOVE THE BURDEN
SHIFTING ELEMENT
Husband also argues that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in its construction and

application of Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10) by allegedly removing the burden
shifting element that has not been relevant to the cohabitation inquiry, or present in the
statute since 1995. Two points are compelling in this regard. First, the burden shifting
element was not dispositive in this case on appeal and is therefore irrelevant. Second, the
analysis of the Utah Court of Appeals regarding the change in the statute was correct.

14

1.

THE BURDEN SHIFTING ELEMENT WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE ON THE
DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO REVERSE THE
TRIAL COURT
The burden shifting element was not dispositive on the outcome of this matter on

appeal, and as such, it should not serve as a basis for reversing the Utah Court of
Appeals. In its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following regarding the
impact of the burden shifting element on Myers on appeal:
We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once Husband proved
common residency the burden of proving the absence of sexual contact
shifted to Wife. As explained above, while the pre-1995 statute included
this kind of burden-shifting mechanism, the current statute does not. It
places the burden of proving cohabitation on the party seeking to terminate
alimony. We also note that the evidence on this point was sufficiently
tenuous that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive
below. It is not, however, dispositive on appeal.
2010 UT App. 74, U 18, n6 (emphasis added). While Wife affirmatively states that the
Utah Court of Appeals did not err in it analysis regarding the Utah Legislature's removal
of the burden shifting component previously found under § 30-3-5, clearly it was not
dispositive on this matter on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to reverse the
Utah Court of Appeals on this basis.
2.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS5 ANALYSIS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 30-3-5 WAS CORRECT
Despite the fact that the burden shift was not dispositive on this case on Appeal, it

is important to note that the Utah Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the change to § 303-5 Utah Code Ann. In regard to termination of alimony for cohabitation, prior to 1995,
Utah Code read, as noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Myers:
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Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex.
However, if it is further established by the person receiving alimony
that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact,
payment of alimony shall resume.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) and Myers, 2010 UT App. 74,113. In 1995, the Utah
Legislature changed that element of the statute. Specifically, as it is now codified the
statute states, "[a]ny order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). As was stated above,
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized this clear change and stated in footnote six of the
opinion that the change in the statute "places the burden of proving cohabitation on the
party seeking to terminate alimony." Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, Tf 18, n6.
In regard to issues of statutory interpretation, the "aim" of a court is "to discover
'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" General Security Indem. Co. of Arizona
v. Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, \ 17, 158 P.3d 1121 quoting Utah v. Tooele Co., 2002 UT
8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, "[t]he plain
language of the statute provides . . . the road map to the statute's meaning, helping to
clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \
52,63P.3d621.
The plain language of the statute is clear. The burden shifting element existed
until 1995 when the Utah Legislature decided to remove it. Currently, under the plain
language of § 30-3-5, alimony may be terminated for cohabitation only "upon
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establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). The language of the statute is
unambiguous; the payor spouse must establish cohabitation in order to terminate alimony.
Currently under established Utah case law, cohabitation requires a showing of "(1)
common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton,
918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Therefore, under a plain language reading of the statute, the payor
spouse bears the burden of establishing the above two elements of cohabitation.
Husband argues that the action of the Utah Legislature was simply to "close a
homosexual loophole, not to make any substantive change to the burden-shifting process
of establishing cohabitation" and that "sound public policy reasons of promoting
marriage and discouraging cohabitation, including those voiced by the legislature in
amending Section 30-3-5(10), support an interpretation of the statute that is consistent
with an ongoing burden-shifting process." Husband's Brief at pg. 18. Husband
elaborates on this public policy argument, stating that failure to maintain the burden
shifting element will result in a situation where "[t]he resulting system will encourage
deceptive cohabitation and discourage marriage, as payees will live with their boyfriends
in hidden sexual relationships to collect alimony (rather than marry and have alimony
automatically terminate)." Husband's Brief at pg. 17.
Husband's public policy argument misunderstands the point of alimony. The
purpose of alimony is not to purchase celibacy on the part of the receiving spouse. Its
purpose is economical, as stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, as it "[enables] 'the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during
17

the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge.'" Myers, 2010
UT App. 74, Tf 16, quoting Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, \ 3. Therefore, before the
receiving spouse can lose an economic benefit, that benefit needs to be supplied in some
degree by another in most cases, that other being an individual who the receiving spouse
is living with in a relationship akin to a marriage.
Husband's argument that the change was made simply to close a homosexual
loophole is also incorrect. Husband's reasoning does not consider or even address the
fact that the Utah Legislature clearly intended to change the statute and explicitly
removed the former burden shifting requirement. Rather, Husband invites this Court to
somehow insert meaning into the statute that does not currently exist, and was in fact,
removed. This Court should decline to do so. Even a plain reading of the statute does
not support Husband's contention. If the Legislature wanted to leave the burden shifting
requirement from a cohabitation analysis, it could have left it and still closed the
"homosexual loophole." Rather, the legislature explicitly removed the burden shift.
Husband attempts to salvage the argument by stating that the Legislature should have
recognized that Haddow controlled the definition of cohabitation and that by changing
the statute to its present form was approving the burden shift that was present in Haddow.
This argument incorrectly describes the responsibilities of the judiciary and legislative
branches of government, and places the judiciary in a position where it is dictating how a
statute is put together and fails to give any deference to the law making power vested in
the legislature.
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Husband's arguments that a paying spouse would never be able to prove the
sexual prong of cohabitation are unpersuasive as well. An examination of cohabitation
case law is telling in this regard. In Sigg, it was admitted that sexual intercourse had
occurred, specifically, it was admitted that "Haynes had open access to her condominium,
visited frequently and that they had intercourse." 905 P.2d at 911, n.4. Similarly, in
another matter, the party who had lost the right to receive alimony "admitted that early in
her relationship with Dennis Warr, they did have sexual relations and that she gave him a
venereal disease." Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 533, 534 (Utah 1983). Consider also
Garcia v. Garcia, where a party admitted that "'she and Ellis shared a bedroom, bed, and
had sexual contact at that residence." 2002 UT App. 381, \ 2, 60 P.3d 1174. In
Pendleton, sexual contact was admitted as well, "[i]n this case, sexual contact has been
admitted." 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Finally, the cohabitating couple in the Haddow matter
had "taken a vacation together to Hawaii, 'sleeping in the same bed and having sexual
relations.'" 707 P.2d at 672. The above situations are what the courts in Utah have
found satisfactory in regard to proving the sexual prong. Husband complains that this
requires too much, but does not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the burden
placed on the paying spouse is impermissible. A paying spouse will be asking a trial
court to take away an economic benefit bestowed on the receiving spouse, provided in
part so that the receiving spouse does not become a ward of the State. In light of the
economic considerations at issue, it does not follow that the burden should necessarily be
an easy one, or one that the payee spouse should bear.
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Husband also fails to adequately explain why it is not similarly flawed to require a
receiving spouse to prove a negative in regard to the sexual prong. A receiving spouse
would have to prove this prong by testifying themselves with the alleged paramour
regarding the nature of the relationship. Presumably they could provide false testimony,
which still does not protect against the harms Husband complains of.
The Legislature found it expedient to remove the burden shifting element and
place the burden upon the paying spouse to prove both prongs of the cohabitation test.
Husband has failed to present decisive arguments that would show otherwise. Therefore,
this Court should decline to reverse the Utah Court of Appeals on this basis.
II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS REVIEW OF
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly reviewed the District Court's factual

determinations in regard to both prongs of the cohabitation test. The Utah Court of
Appeals should not be reversed under this issue for three reasons. First, the Utah Court
of Appeals did not disturb any of the findings of fact made by the trial court. Second,
Husband's arguments regarding what the trial court could have inferred from the
evidence are not compelling. Third, Husband's arguments encouraging this Court to
consider factors not on the record are inappropriate.
A.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DISTURB ANY OF THE
FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT
Because the Utah Court of Appeals did not disturb any of the findings of fact

made by the trial court, it should not be reversed. It is important initially to consider the
standard of review that was correctly applied in this matter by the Utah Court of Appeals,
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specifically, "[wjhether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact and law. While
we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly
erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen, 2007 UT App
377, f 2, quoting Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160. Under this standard, only the factual
findings of the trial court are given deference. The ultimate conclusion of the trial court
is reviewed for correctness.
In order to establish cohabitation, two prongs must be satisfied, (1) common
residency, which is defined as "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time;" and (2) sexual
contact, which "means participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to
that generally existing between husband and wife." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. The Utah
Court of Appeals was required to, and did, look at the facts of this particular case, and
then decided whether or not they were sufficient to support the ultimate conclusions that
there was both the "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time;" and "participation
in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between
husband and wife." Id.
Consider the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter:
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Wife spent 80% of her nights at her
parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay as a foster
child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or more male
roommates while she slept on a couch in the basement. They were
romantically involved, were 'paired up' at social events, and apparently
shared a furtive sexual relationship. They treated each other as boyfriend
and girlfriend. But they did not establish a common household; we have no
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evidence of shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared space, or
shared meals. Nor did they maintain 'a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.'
Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was, it bore little resemblance to a
marriage. Accordingly, they were not cohabitating for purposes of section
30-3-5(10). Terminating alimony on this ground was error.
Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, ^J 18. A careful review of this paragraph, and the entire
opinion, shows that none of the trial court's findings of fact were disturbed or overturned.
What is evident from the above cited paragraph is that the Utah Court of Appeals found
as a matter of law that the findings of fact made by the trial court did not support the
ultimate conclusion of the trial court. The Utah Court of Appeals therefore acted within
the boundaries of the standard of review and was not in err.
Many of Husband's arguments regarding the findings of fact reflect a
misunderstanding of the applicable standard. The issues that Husband raises deal with
the ultimate conclusions that the Utah Court of Appeals made, not a disruption of the
factual findings of the trial court. Again, the Utah Court of Appeals did not overturn any
of the findings, it simply found as a matter of law that the facts did not support the
ultimate conclusion that Wife and M.H. shared a common residence, or that there was
sexual contact akin to that existing in a marriage.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS BASED ON SPECULATION AS TO WHAT THE TRIAL
COURT COULD HAVE INFERRED FROM THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
Husband makes arguments based on what he believes the trial court could have

inferred from the evidence introduced at trial. For example, Husband states in regard to
the sharing of meals that "[w]hile there was sufficient evidence that established the
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existence of a common residence without taking testimony on shared meals, the trial
court could have reasonably inferred that Ex-Wife and M.H. shared meals from the
undisputed fact that Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable. The court of appeals should
have given the trial judge the benefit of that inference." Husband's Brief at pg. 20,
internal citations omitted. The trial court made no findings in regard to shared meals.
Husband essentially faults the Utah Court of Appeals for not making findings for the trial
court, and further argues that these findings should be based on evidence not on the
record, but by inference from other evidence. Husband cites to no legal authority for the
correctness of his assertion. Husband's analysis is simply incorrect, and inappropriately
faults the Utah Court of Appeals.
C.

HUSBAND'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF
THE RECORD ARE INAPPROPRIATE
Husband also argues that this Court should look beyond the record in determining

whether or not the Utah Court of Appeals was in err. For example, Husband states that
the Utah Court of Appeals:
did not witness Ex-Wife shifting nervously on the witness stand as
she engaged in obvious deception regarding the nature of her
relationship to M.H.; it did not witness the angry glares Ex-Wife
shot at her son, and the comments she made as her adult son began
to testify regarding the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H. glares and comments that had an obvious impact on the son, who
began to change his testimony from his earlier affidavit (the impact
of Ex-Wife's behavior on her son was so obvious that the trial judge
stopped the proceedings temporarily, cautioned Ex-Wife to stop, and
then cautioned the son to start telling the truth).
Husband's Brief at pgs. 21-22.

23

The inappropriateness of these comments is obvious. Husband asks this Court to
take his word for actions that may or may not have happened in the court room and that
are not on the record. At the very least, Husband is presenting his own perceptions of the
behavior of witnesses, which are irrelevant. Further, in regard to the admonition by the
trial court to Wife, which is raised by Husband in his Brief, the transcript reads in
relevant part:
THE JUDGE: Well, I need you to speak about it because the law says that you must.
You're a witness, you have to speak about it. Okay. I know you're guarded, right now,
you're - THE WITNESS: So what is my rights to - THE JUDGE: Well, you have no rights at this point, sir, other than to tell the truth. That
is what you're supposed to do is tell the truth. If you don't tell the truth I'll have to hold
you in contempt and send you to jail until you are willing to tell the truth.
SPEAKER: (Short inaudible, no mic).
THE WITNESS:

I also have the right - -

THE JUDGE: Ma'am, I'm going to take, whoa, I'm going to take control of this case
right now. You will not say another word unless your attorney tells you you could say
another word.
Tr. at 102:13-25 and 103:1-3. What is evident from this exchange is that a speaker,
presumably Wife, stated something that was inaudible, and the trial court informed her
that she was not to speak unless it was appropriate and that her attorney would tell her
when she could speak. The record does not show, and the trial court does not state, that
24

the admonition is for any purpose other than what is stated above, specifically, it does not
show that the trial court is admonishing Wife because of the impact she was having on
her son's testimony. Quite simply, Husband attempts to insert facts onto the record and
expects this Court to accept his perceptions as true. This is inappropriate and should be
ignored by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Wife respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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Before Judges McHUGH, ORME, and VOROS.
OPINION (For Official Publication)
VOROS, Judge:
* i 11 1 Petitioner Becky Sue Myers (Wife) appeals the trial court's order terminating alimony on
the ground that she was cohabitating in her parents' home with her parents' teenage foster son. We
reverse.
BACKGROUND
H 2 Tracy Lynn Myers (Husband) and Wife were divorced in June 2006, after eighteen years of
marriage. Wife was awarded alimony. In the months following the divorce, Wife "never had a
permanent home/' but "bounced all over the place." She stayed with friends, with her daughters, and
with her parents at their home in Provo, Utah.
H 3 Her parents' house had three bedrooms, one of which they occupied. The other two bedrooms
were occupied by as many as six foster boys, including M.H. Grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and
"ex-foster boys" also slept over from time to time.
H 4 When Wife stayed with her parents, she slept on a couch in the basement. She also received
mail at her parents' address. Wife's family members testified that she never lived there, but would
sleep over intermittently, "maybe once a month." But a private investigator hired by Husband
observed Wife's car at her parents' house four out of the five days he drove past in June 2007,
including at least one time early in the morning. Based on this information, the trial court found "the
most credible and persuasive evidence" to be that Wife "spent at least 80% of her nights" at her
parents' home, and that it was, in fact, her residence in the spring and summer of 2007.
H 5 At the heart of this dispute is Wife's relationship with M.H. The trial court heard no direct
evidence that Wife and M.H. had a sexual relationship. Wife testified that they did not. Husband
acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of a sexual relationship between Wife and M.H.
Neither party called M.H. to testify.
H 6 Several witnesses described Wife's relationship with M.H. The parties' son (Son) swore in an

affidavit that he "d[id] not have any doubt" that his mother was having a sexual relationship with
M.H., that M.H. spoke of Wife "as his girlfriend/' that they "flirt[ed] with each other all the t i m e / ' that
he once saw Wife pretending to be asleep on the couch while M.H. lay on the floor next to the couch,
that Wife acted jealous when "she thought [M.H.] was hanging out with girls/' and that he had seen
M.H. acting "like a heart-broken, love-sick boy." Son also stated that Wife once borrowed his car so
that she could visit M.H. after M.H. had moved to Salt Lake City. But at trial, Son equivocated on
most of these points, admitting that he had "probably not" read his affidavit before signing it and
acknowledging that he had no proof of a sexual relationship.
H 7 The parties' daughter (Daughter) also testified. Daughter's affidavit stated that M.H. and Wife
"[were] always together whenever I[saw] them." She stated that she began to think there was a
romantic relationship between Wife and M.H. when Wife asked her to get out of the passenger seat of
her car so that M.H. could sit there. Daughter also observed them at a family party sitting "side by
side, ... treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend," and then leaving together.
At trial, Daughter confirmed many of the statements in her affidavit and testified that she believed
Wife and M.H. had a romantic relationship because they fought like lovers rather than friends.
* 2 U 8 Based on this and other evidence, the trial court concluded that Husband had established
that Wife and M.H. shared "a common residency." The trial court then ruled that, Husband having
made this showing, "the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to [Wife]," and that Wife
"has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact." On the contrary, the court "believe[d]
that the most credible evidence before the [c]ourt indicate[d] that [Wife and M.H.] had a sexual
relationship."
U 9 Having found that Wife and M.H. shared a common residence and had a sexual relationship,
the trial court concluded it had "no wiggle room to look at equities r to look at fairness or anything like
that," but "must find that under the Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1995 that a condition of
cohabitation did exist." Accordingly, the court terminated alimony effective January 3 1 , 2008. —
Wife appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEiW
"»»<iy

»i(>>

***tt>r

n i ^121 ^111 ^ 11 10 The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in concluding that
Wife was cohabitating and, consequently, in terminating alimony. "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a
mixed question of fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are
shown to be clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen v. Jensen,
2007 UT ADD 377, 11 2, 173 P.3d 223 (quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 fUtah
Ct.ADD.1996^.
ANALYSIS
H 11 Utah Code section 30-3-5 lists seven factors a court "shall consider" in determining alimony.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5f8)fa) ( 2 0 0 7 ) . — All but one pertain to financial considerations:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school
during the marriage.

Id. In contrast to these mandatory considerations, "the fault of the parties" is at most a factor that
the court "may consider" in determining alimony.— Id. § 30-3-5(8)(b).
£41 j d H 12 This statutory scheme makes clear that the principal purpose of alimony is economic, *
'to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge/ " Ostermiller v. Ostermiller,
2008 UT ADD 249, 11 3, 190 P.3d 13 (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 fUtah 1986)) cert,
granted, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah Jan. 23, 2009) (No. 20080769); see also Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(8)(d)
('The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living."). * 'Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the
w i f e . ' " English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Nelson
Divorce and Annulment § 14.06 11-12 (2d Ed.1961 Rev. Vol.)).
* 3 H 13 Unless a divorce decree provides otherwise, alimony "automatically terminates upon the
remarriage or death" of the recipient spouse. Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(9). The recipient spouse
cannot evade this result by merely cohabitating with another rather than remarrying: "Any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Id. 5 30-3-5(10).
However, this statutory provision has spoken in terms of cohabitation only since 1995. Its
predecessor statute divided the concept into (1) residing with a person of the opposite sex, and (2)
sexual contact. See id. 5 30-3-5(6) (1995). It also split the burden of persuasion; proof of common
residency shifted the burden to the recipient spouse to disprove sexual contact:
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex.
However, if it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or
association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
Id.
H 14 In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), our supreme court interpreted this
subsection to refer to cohabitation, which in this context means " 'to live together as husband and
wife / " Id. at 671 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed.1979); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 257 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ) . — Thus, the court construed the first statutory factor-residing with a person
of the opposite sex-to mean "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 672. The court construed the
second statutory factor-sexual contact-to mean "participation in a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and w i f e . " I d . It thus concluded t h a t "
'cohabitation' means to dwell together in a common residence and to participate in sexual contact
that evidences a larger conjugal relationship." Id. at 674. This court has consistently applied this twopart test. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah Ct.App.1996); Sigg v. Sigg, 905
P.2d 908, 917-18 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
H 15 The legislature evidently approved the gloss Haddow placed on the subsection. In 1995, it
abandoned any reference to the separate factors of common residency and sexual contact in favor of
Haddow's focus on cohabitation. See Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(8) (Supp.1996). Jettisoned with the
two factors was the shifting burden of persuasion; since 1995, the spouse seeking to terminate
alimony bears the burden to establish cohabitation. See id. Even after this amendment, however, our
cases have continued to see the related concepts of common residency and sexual contact as key in
determining whether a couple is in fact cohabitating. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, 11
2, 173 P.3d 223 (citing Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917). Factors bearing on this question include whether the
parties have keys to a single house, see Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161, keep their belongings in one
home, see Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918, share meals and food expenses, see id., and share living expenses
or assets, see Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671.
* 4 H 16 Making cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is consistent with alimony's

purpose of enabling "the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge/' Ostermiller,
2008 UT App 249, 11 3, 190 P.3d 13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gavet v. Gavet, 92
N J . 149, 456 A.2d 102, 103 fNJ.1983) ("[There is] a policy to end alimony when the supported
spouse forms a new bond that eliminates the prior dependency as a matter of law/'). Just as the
award of alimony "is not intended as a penalty against the husband," English, 565 P.2d at 4 1 1 ,
neither is the termination of alimony intended as a penalty against the wife.
H 17 In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that the trial court took an unduly
narrow view of cohabitation. As noted above, while common residency and sexual contact are
certainly key to the question of whether two people have formed a relationship resembling a
marriage-most married couples do live together and have at least occasional sexual contact-the
inquiry does not end there. A court must take the next step and determine whether the parties
entered into a relationship "akin to that generally existing between husband and wife/' - ^ Haddow,
707 P.2d at 672.
H 18 Wife and M.H. clearly did not have such a relationship. In the late spring and summer of
2007, Wife spent 8 0 % of her nights at her parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay
as a foster child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or more male roommates while she
slept on a couch in the basement. They were romantically involved, were "paired up" at social events,
and apparently shared a furtive sexual relationship.-^ They treated each other as boyfriend and
girlfriend. But they did not establish a common household; we have no evidence of shared expenses,
shared decision-making, shared space, or shared meals. Nor did they maintain "a relatively
permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id. at 672.
Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was, it bore little resemblance to a marriage. Accordingly, they
were not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10). Terminating alimony on this ground was
error.
CONCLUSION
H 19 The trial court erred in concluding that Wife was cohabitating. Although Wife and M.H.
sometimes slept under the same roof and may have been sexually involved, their relationship did not
rise to the level of a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Accordingly, terminating alimony
on this ground was error. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
H 20 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.

FN1. The trial court noted that Husband had not otherwise established a change in
circumstances that would have "resulted in a termination of alimony based on financial
consideration."

FN2. The relevant portions of the Utah Code have not changed since the divorce. Except
as otherwise noted, we cite to the current version for the reader's convenience.

FN3. The status of this factor is unclear. In Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, 138 P.3d 84,
a panel of this court held that a husband's "extramarital affairs and ... prolonged deceitful
conduct ... presented] precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the
trial court to consider fault" and his "fault [went] a long way in explaining the propriety"
of an alimony award that "would be too high if only economic factors were considered."
Id. H 23. Three years later, in Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, 223 P.3d 476, a divided
panel of this court, without purporting to overrule Riley, held that "until the legislature
clearly defines fault in the statute, it is inappropriate to attach any consequence to the
consideration of fault when making an alimony award." Id. H 20. As the point is not
essential to the resolution of the case at bar, we leave for another day the task of
resolving this apparent "evolution of two conflicting interpretations of the same legal

doctrine by different panels of judges." State v. Thurman, 846 P,2d 1256, 1269 (Utah
1993).

F1M4. One term may have different meanings in different statutory contexts. Thus, as
used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the term "cohabitant" includes many categories of
persons who do not live together as husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. 5 78B-7-102
(2) (2008). This court has previously stated that it sees in this broader definition "no
legislative intent to abrogate the case law defining cohabitation in the alimonytermination context." Hilly. Hill. 968 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct.App.1998). It is simply the
case that "the supreme court has adopted a narrower definition in the alimonytermination context than the Legislature has in the cohabitant-abuse context." I d .

FN5. Cohabitation is not the same as so-called common law marriage. While cohabitation
is one requirement of a valid but unsolemnized marriage, there are others. For example,
the couple must "hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. 5 30-1-4.5 f2007).

FN6. We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once Husband proved common
residency the burden of proving the absence of sexual contact shifted to Wife. As
explained above, while the pre-1995 statute included this kind of burden-shifting
mechanism, the current statute does not. It places the burden of proving cohabitation on
the party seeking to terminate alimony. We also note that the evidence on this point was
sufficiently tenuous that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive below.
It is not, however, dispositive on appeal. Even assuming for purposes of our analysis that
Wife and M.H. were having sexual contact, they were not living together in a manner akin
to husband and wife, and thus were not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10).

Utah App.,2010.
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ADDENDUM B
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4TB DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673
m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1,2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS
1.

Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this
case, effective January 31, 2008.

2.

The clerk of the court shall pay $ 1,200 of the funds on deposit with the

Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker.
3.

The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black.

4.

The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the
foregoing.

DATED this

b

day of

. 2008.
BY THE COURT:
J
SAMUEL MCVEY
J
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner

NOTICE

Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the
time.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this
J ^ < - / . 2008:
7
SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017

/ 5?

day of

OCT 0 6 ^ J
A

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673

SLr^^&
uTAH CO'i^ '

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6,2006.

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to

pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony.
3.

In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on
the weekends.

4.

There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an infrequent
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr.
Hunstman, testified that during the period from June 26, 2007 through
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court
fmds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home.

5.

On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms.
The Court also finds that Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least
that night in the same house.

6.

It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents
during the late spring and summer of 2007.

7.

It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer
of 2007 at her parent's home.

8.

It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on
documents she submitted to the court in. a separate criminal case.

9.

Petitioner slept on the downstairs coafcn at her parent's home, often
arriving there late at night.

10.

Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent.

11.

Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills,
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and
summer of 2007.

12.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her
parent's house.

13.

Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart
and going together with him to events as a couple.

14.

Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner.

15.

On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents.

16.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which

the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
17.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship.

18.

Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for
the last few months.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
2.

Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
3.

Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency.

4.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which

the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart m
Salt Lake City.
5.

As Respondent has established a common residency between the

Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact

6.

Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case

terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with
another person.
7.

In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be

terminated effective January 31, 2008.
8.

From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or

$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit
with the Court should be paid to Respondent.
DATED this

A

day of

U f l ^ "

2008.

BY THE COURT:

U*
SAMUEL MCVEY

T > ' ---'—7

/
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner

f

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this
U

day of ' U CT

.

2008:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017
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ADDENDUM C

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Title/Chapter/Section: |

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search
G o T o

|

Utah Code
Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter 3 Divorce
Section 5 Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time - Determination of alimony ~
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children —
Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every
decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental
expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses
such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health,
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4
which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or
dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under

this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.

(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume
if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying ahmony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
Amended by Chapter 285, 2010 General Session
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ADDENDUM D

30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Power of court to vacate decree of divorcee
or separation upon request of both parties, 3
ALR 3d 1216.
Prayer to impress trust upon property orr
otherwise settle property rights, propriety of£
inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment, 933
ALR 327.

Standing of strangers to divorce proceeding to attack validity of divorce decree 12
ALR 2d 717.
Sufficiency of allegation of adultery in suit
for divorce, 2 ALR 1621.
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree
after remarriage of party, 17 ALR 4th 1153.

30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child.
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined.
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship
or association between them is without any sexual contact.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. may be made by the court with respect to the
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933 disposal of the children or the distribution of
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. property as shall be reasonable and proper."
81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1.
The 1975 amendment added the last sentence of subsec. (1).
Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment added subsecs. (2)
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws and (3).
1876, § 1155; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2606.
The 1984 amendment substituted "include
The 1969 amendment deleted a provision in it" for "make" in the first sentence of
that children ten years of age and of sound subsec. (1); inserted the second and third senmind have the privilege of selecting the par- tences in subsec. (1); inserted "and health
ent to which they will attach themselves; and and dental care" in the fourth sentence of
substituted the fourth sentence of subsec. (1) subsec. (1); and made minor changes in
for "Such subsequent changes or new orders phraseology and punctuation.
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